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Who Owns the Family Farm?
The Struggle to Determine the
Property Rights of Farm Wives
SUSAN

A. SCHNEIDER*

From our nation's inception the family farm has always been
proclaimed the cornerstone of American agriculture.'
INTRODUCTION

Support for the family farm as the appropriate model for agriculture has
been a politically popular cause for generations. 2 Defining what is meant
by the term "family farm," however, has been a difficult task. Notions
of
the appropriate size, structure and value of the family farm have converged
to create complicated definitions of this deceptively simple concept.3 For
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1. DON E. ALBRECHT
AGRICULTURE 50 (1990).

& STEVE

H. MURDOCK,

THE SOCIOLOGY OF U.S.

2. Support for the family farm has led to the formation and subsequent
reform of
government sponsored lending programs such as the Farmers Home Administration
that target
family farming operations. See 7 U.S.C. § 1921 (1992). Numerous non-profit
organizations
such as Farm-Aid, the Center for Rural Affairs, and Farmers Legal
Action Group, were
formed and continue to exist primarily to support family farming. The current
farm program
has been under increasing criticism for failing to target payments
to family farms.
Christopher R. Kelley & Alan R. Malasky, FederalFarm ProgramPayment-Limitations
Law:
A Lawyer's Guide, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 199, 205 n.7 (1991).
But see generally
Christopher R. Kelley, Rethinking the Equities of Federal Farm Programs,
14 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 613 (1994) (questioning the wisdom of targeting farm program payments
to small farm
operations). For a fascinating analysis of the popular image of farming and
a frank discussion of our perceptions, see WILLIAM P. BROWNE ET AL., SACRED
Cows AND HOT
POTATOES: AGRARIAN MYTHS IN AGRICULTURAL POLICY (1992).

3. See MARTY STRANGE, FAMILY FARMING: A NEW ECONOMIC VISION 3 (1988),
(A
book "unabashed in its advocacy for family farming," Marty Strange
describes family
farming as "[a] system of small-scale, widely dispersed farms, owned
and operated by
independent proprietors who are permitted to enjoy the fruits of their
efforts."). This
definition invokes size, ownership and structural requirements in addition
to assuming the
family focus. For purposes of this article, the author prefers the less restrictive
and perhaps
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example, the view of the sole proprietorship as the appropriate business
structure for "family farms" has produced detailed anti-corporate farming
laws that limit both corporate and partnership farming in order to protect the
"family farm."'4 If corporate farming is allowed, the degree of kinship of
5
the shareholders may be regulated. Gross revenue maximums have been
6
proposed through the means testing of farm programs. Even the amount
7
of debt has been used as a defining criteria.
Central to all of the notions of family farming, however, is the ever
present picture of the farmer husband and his wife toiling together to earn
their livelihood from the soil. Existing somewhere in between the image of
a farm woman in a Grant Wood painting and Jessica Lang in the movie
"Country," the farm wife is fundamentally tied to our image of family
less fanciful definition referenced in BROWNE ET AL., supra note 2, at 30. This definition,
attributed to rural sociologists Kevin Goss, Richard Rodefeld and Frederick Buttel, defines
the family farm as "any operation where the family owns a majority of the capital resources
the
(land, machinery, buildings), makes the majority of management decisions, and provides
Id.
majority of labor."
4. For example, under Minnesota law, a "family farm" is defined as an "unincorporated farming unit owned by one or more persons residing on the farm or actively engaged in
farming." MINN. STAT. § 500.24(2)(b) (1994). Corporations and partnerships are permitted
to own farm land only if they meet certain specified criteria. This law has as its stated
purpose: "to encourage and protect the family farm as a basic economic unit, to insure it as
the most socially desirable mode of agricultural production, and to enhance and promote the
stability and well-being of rural society in Minnesota and the nuclear family." MINN. STAT.
§ 500.24, subd. 1 (1994). In an attempt to achieve this broad purpose, the law essentially
provides that corporations, limited liability companies, pension or investment funds, and
limited partnerships could not engage in farming or own farm land. It then provides a
number of specifically defined exceptions to this blanket prohibition. With regard to
corporations, the law defines what it terms "family farm corporations" and "authorized farm
corporations" according to their ownership and structure. These types of corporations are
exempted from the general prohibition. Similarly, the law defines categories that it terms
"family farm partnerships" and "authorized farm partnerships" that are also exempted from
the prohibition. MINN. STAT. § 500.24 (1994).
5. The Minnesota law referenced in note 4 restricts "family farm partnerships" and
"family farm corporations" to entities in which a majority of the stockholders or partners are
"persons or the spouse of persons related to each other within the third degree of kindred
according to the rules of civil law." MINN. STAT. § 500.24(c), (h) (1994). The statute also
contains provisions for "authorized" corporations and partnerships that are not held to the
famial restrictions. MINN. STAT. § 500.24(d), (i) (1994).
6. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuB. No. RCED-87-144, ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS
FOR TARGETING PAYMENTS AND CROP LOANS (1987).
i. Chapter 12 bankruptcy reorganization is available to "family farmers," the
definition of which includes the requirement that the farming operation's "aggregate debts
do not exceed $1,500,000." 11 U.S.C. § 101(18) (1992), referencing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231
(1992).
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farming. In reality, however, her place in the structure of family farming
is an issue that has evaded careful analysis. This article explores the legal
role and property rights of the farm wife and asks the questions, is she a
farmer, does she own an interest in the family farm?
This exploration is undertaken with an understanding that an analysis
of farm wives may be just as daunting a task as trying to characterize the
family farm itself. Just as the term "family farm" has been difficult to
define, farm wives make up a diverse group seemingly united only by
gender, marital status and some connection to farming.8 As with farming
itself, this group encompasses a full spectrum of variety. On one hand, as
has been the case for generations in rural America, some "farm women" take
an active role in their family farming operations. 9 For example, this year's
president-elect of the South Dakota Pork Producer's Association is a woman
who manages an 850-head feeder pig operation as her participation in their
family farm operation.' 0 In contrast, other women reside on a farm and
assist with farming tasks when needed, but rely upon their husbands for the
primary management of the operation."
Several issues, however, serve to unite this otherwise diverse group of
women. First, although degrees and categories of involvement vary
significantly, most wives in a family farm setting make a substantial
contribution to the farming operation. 2 Even if it does not involve
8. With due deference to ranchers, for simplicity, the terms "farmer" and "farming"
will be used to encompass all persons and activities associated with agriculture.
9. An excellent tribute to some of the most active women farmers during the farm
financial crisis of the 1980's can be found in DLANNA HUNTER, BREAKING HARD GROUND:
STORIES OF THE MINNESOTA FARM ADVOCATES (1990). This book presents an oral history
of the Minnesota Farm Advocate Program, a program which relied heavily on the strength
and integrity of certain Minnesota farm women.
10. Feeder Pigs Are Fun, HIGH PLAINS J., Apr. 25, 1994, at 1 (featuring Marsha
Sumter, president-elect of the South Dakota Pork Producers Council). Ms Sumter is a member of a family farm corporation in South Dakota. According to her description of the
division of labor in her family, her husband handles the mechanical repair and service of the
farm machinery and equipment, her brother raises sheep, and she raises the hogs.
11. Elise Boulding, The Labor of U.S. Farm Women: A Knowledge Gap, 7 SOC. OF
WORK & 0Occ. 261, 275 (1980).
12. For an excellent statistical and anecdotal analysis of farm women, see RACHEL
A. ROSENFELD, FARM WOMEN, 269-71 (1985). Rosenfeld used the data from the 1980 Farm
Women Survey, the first national survey of farm women, to examine women's participation
in farming operations. With regard to the work that farm women do, she notes that
frequently family and farm related tasks undertaken by the farm wife blend together both in
time and function. The majority of farm women have these blended responsibilities on the
farm. Tasks in this overlapping category include growing and preserving food for the family,
meal preparation for the family and other farm laborers, and supervision of the children.
Nevertheless, of the "pure" farming tasks, a majority of the women surveyed performed the
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running an operation exclusively or actually planting or harvesting, the
woman's contribution may be the traditional bookkeeping role or her
3
participation in farm management decisions. Moreover, the woman's role
may be to provide the flexibility necessary to address the sudden labor and
4
As one North
management needs that frequently arise in farming.
Carolina farm wife described her role, "[mly job is to take over what needs
s In other instances, the farm wife
to be done, whatever comes along."
may have off-farm employment that provides a necessary capital contribu6
tion to the farming operation. Whatever the specific role, however, the
"traditional" farm wife tasks of running farm related errands and bookkeeping in addition to
their role in the family. The majority of women assisted in the care of farm animals and
participated in at least some aspects of the farm financial decision making. About half said
that they assisted with harvesting. Almost 40% said they took some part in technical farm
decision making such as trying new crops and when to market. 55% considered themselves
to be one of the main farm operators, and 60% of the married women felt they could run the
farm without a husband. Moreover, the participation of women in the family farming
operation is not a recent phenomenon. A North Carolina farm wife summarized her daily
routine in 1939 as follows:
I was hollered out of bed at four o'clock and after I'd got the house cleaned up if
I didn't go to the branch to wash, I went to the field to hoe. When I seen the sun
get to noon I went back to the house an cooked dinner. Then when I'd hung my
dishrag on the plum bush outside the kitchen door I grabbed my splitbonnet and
took back to the cornfield.
JACK T. KIRBY, RURAL WORLDS LOST - THE AMERICAN SOUTH

1920-1960 157 (1987)

(citation omitted). There is evidence, also, of a "new breed" of young farmers that not only
both actively contribute to the farming operation, but also view the husband and wife as
equal partners in the operation. ROSENFELD, supra at 111 (citations omitted).
13. Rosenfeld, supra note 12, at Ill. It is interesting to note that although the
importance of these "traditional" functions of the farm wife have frequently been
downplayed, financial planning and management decisions are now recognized by agricultural
economists as central to the survival of the modern farming enterprise.
14. Due to the "unique nature of farm production," agriculture is presented with
difficult labor problems. ALBRECHT & MURDOCK, supra note 1, at 56. Dependent upon

biological processes, a fanning operation may require extensive amounts of labor at certain
points in the year and relatively little labor at other points. Rural sociologists have observed
that this labor problem was addressed differently in different regions of the country. In the
west, migrant laborers were employed and in the south, first slavery, then sharecropping was
used. In the midwest, family farming was the solution. Id. at 56-57 (citations omitted).

15. ROSENFELD, supra note 12, at 280 (citing Thomas Moore, Walters Enjoys Farm

Life, CHAPEL HILL NEWSP. (North Carolina), Nov. 27, 1984, at A-6).
16. See, e.g., Andersen v. Andersen, 374 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(recognizing the wife's "substantial contribution" to the farming operation in that she had offfarm employment that helped pay family expenses); Kittelson v. Kittelson, 272 N.W.2d 86,
89 (S.D. 1978) (finding that wife "clearly contributed in a substantive manner to the
accumulation of the marital property" where the earnings from her part time job were applied
to tractor gasoline bills and basic family needs). But see In re Marriage of Lattig, 318

1994:689]

WHO OWNS THE FAMILY FARM?

majority of farm wives contribute to the operation of their family's farm. 7
Second, it can be argued that the contribution of women to agriculture
has not been adequately appreciated."8 As one author noted, "Women are
part of family farms. But because farming has been defined as a male
occupation, their roles on and for the farm have often been overlooked or
undervalued."' 9
Third, legal and social barriers have discouraged farm
wives from taking an active or public role in farming. 20 These barriers
N.W.2d 811, 814 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (wife found to not have contributed to the farming
operation when "biggest share" of off-farm income was used for her children, though some
groceries and meals were also purchased). The importance of off-farm income to the
financial stability of smaller faming operations has been observed, and researchers state that
"female members of farm families are becoming increasingly important in the non-farm labor
force." ALBRECHT & MURDOCK, supra note 1, at 48-49. A 1980 study indicated that "both
husbands and wives gave financing farm investment' as one reason for off farm employment.
ROSENFELD, supra note 12, at 145 (citing RYOHEi KADA, PART-TaME FAMILY FARMING: OFFFARM EMPLOYMENT AND FARM ADJusTmENTs IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN (1980)).

17. There are, of course, exceptions. In the case of Owen v. Owen, 351 N.W.2d 139
(S.D. 1984), an appeal from the property division set forth in a dissolution decree, the court
noted that the farm wife had not only not contributed, she had "in fact, hindered the farm
operation." Id. at 142. Further explanation was not provided in the opinion.
18. For example, the Economic Research Service of the USDA recently published a
report on women farm landlords. This report revealed that "[florty percent of private (that
is, non-corporate, non-public) agricultural landlords are women, and they control 40 percent
of the privately held farmland rented out." Nevertheless, despite the fact that "[w]omen who
own and lease out farmland form a large portion of farm landlords ...their role in the
farmland leasing market has largely been unexplored." DENISE M. ROGERS & ANN M.
VANDEMAN, WOMEN FARM LANDLORDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (USDA Economic
Research Service, Agric. Info. Bull. 681, 1993).
19. ROSENFELD, supra note 12, at 269. A judicial example of this under appreciation
can be found in Meservey v. Merservey, 841 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). Here, the
state appellate court reversed the trial court finding that the wife's labor contributed to the
increase in value of the stock of the family farm corporation. The court stated that "[tihe
record evinces Ms. Meservey's devotion to the family farming operation without compensation and in addition to her usual family duties: she took meals to field workers, fed the
livestock, moved farm machinery, and located parts for repairs." letat 246. Nevertheless,
the court declined to characterize her efforts as "substantial marital effort," noting that she
had "failed to show the value of those services and to prove any connection between the
performance of those services and the increase in the value of the corporate stock." Id. But
see, Craig v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 378, 381 (D.S.D. 1978) (comforts provided to hired
help instrumental in obtaining quality farm help).
20. The perception of farming as a male occupation persists and acts as a social barrier
to wives seeking greater involvement in the family farm operation. In a family farm case
in which a bank failed to obtain the wife's signature on loan documents, and in which the
facts revealed that the wife was integrally involved in the farming operation, the wife
testified that the banker told her that "a wife usually didn't know much about this stuff, about
the banking and farming part." Farmers Sec. Bank of Zumbrota v. Voegele, 386 N.W.2d
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have been most obvious with regard to property ownership and control.
While the barriers seemed almost insurmountable in the past, many legal
gains have been achieved. However, there still remain significant legal and
social obstacles confronting farm wives in gaining recognition of their rights
with respect to family-run agricultural endeavors. Moreover, there remain
many complex issues and unanswered questions regarding their legal role,
particularly concerning farm property. These obstacles, issues and questions
create a degree of unity in the otherwise diverse class of "farm wives."
In addressing the legal role and status of the farm wife, three areas will
be discussed. First, a brief overview of historical transition in the legal
status of wives will be presented. This overview will focus on early
common law and the changes brought about by the Married Women's
Property Acts. It will conclude with a summary of the current property
allocation systems affecting husbands' and wives' respective interests in
property. Second, the current law affecting the respective ownership rights
of husbands and wives to family farm assets will be analyzed. This section
will be divided into an analysis of a farm wife's ownership interests in farm
assets and an analysis of her legal control over her assets. Third, the law
of federal farm programs will be briefly discussed, focusing on the husbandwife rule, and contrasting the current treatment of farm husbands and wives
to that under the previous regulations.
I. THE HISTORICAL TRANSMON IN THE LEGAL STATUS
. OF WOMEN AS WIVES

There was a time, not so long ago, when a different understanding
2
of the family and the Constitutionprevailed.
Without belittling the discrimination claims of women today, it is
important to consider the progress made in the last century. This consideration is most accurately characterized as an examination of how difficult
things were for women who wished to own or control property in past
generations. It is further interesting to consider that the legal status of
women as wives was particularly minimized. As will be evidenced, wives
had a legal status not only below that of men, but far below that of single
women.

760, 763 n.4 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). She also testified that when she and her husband went
to the bank, the president would meet with her husband rather than her. Id. A bank
employee testified that it was the "practice" of the bank "just to deal with the husband of the
farm family." Id.
21. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2830 (1992).
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A. WIVES AS LEGAL INCOMPETENTS

Prior to the passage of remedial statutes known as the Married
Women's Property Acts, women lost substantial legal rights by marrying.22
As one historian described it, "In one way or another, everything women
owned before marriage became their husband's afterward."23 For example,
although single women could own real or personal property, once married,
a woman's personal property became that of her husband. 24 Although she
retained title to her real property, her husband had the right to manage it and
to collect the profits for his own use.25 Married women could not enter
into contracts, bring legal actions, or transfer property without the consent
or joinder of their husbands. 26 At first blush, this infringement upon the
rights of married women appears consistent with the notion that a husband
22. Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 U.S.(I Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (reaffirming the commonlaw principle that a "woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was
regarded as her head and representative in the social state). See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2830-31.
For an excellent analysis of historical development of the property rights of married women,
see MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA (1986).

See also Scott Greene, Comparison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and
Common-Law Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility with the Current
View of the Marriage Relationship and Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 71, 76-79
(1979). Greene described the effect of marriage in terms of two major principles, one
revoking the woman's legal status and the other abolishing her property rights:
The early common-law property system can be characterized by two major
principles which became applicable on marriage. First, the wife's legal identity
merged into that of the husband's and ceased to exist. Second, there was a total
domination of the wife by the husband. The husband became absolute owner of
his wife's chattels and, while not given title to his wife's land, he did acquire
valuable rights therein, including the estate by marital rights or jure uxoris and
curtesy. These rights taken together deprived the wife of her chattels and of
virtually all the valuable rights in her land.
Id. at 77 (citations omitted).
23. SALMON, supra note 22, at 41.

24. ELIZABETH B. WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN

1800-1861, 7 (1987) (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *433).
25. Id. at 9.
26. For a discussion of the reasoning behind this restriction, see SALMON, supra note
22 at 41-44. According to Salmon, Blackstone attributed this rule to the unity of husband
and wife. Other jurists, notably Tapping Reeve, Connecticut Supreme Court Justice, argued
that two other reasons supported the rule. First, judicial acceptance of coercion of wives by
their husbands made all contracts signed by married women suspect. In this regard, the
courts acted for the good of women by removing a wife's ability to contract. Second, were
a woman to be bound by her contracts, it followed that she could be imprisoned for the
breach of that contract. This would deprive her husband of the company of his wife, and the
right of a husband to the person of his wife "is a right guarded by the law with the utmost
solicitude." Id. at 41-42 (citations omitted).
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27 There is, however, an
and wife become one person upon marriage.
independent basis of sexism in that men not only retained their rights upon
marriage, these rights were enhanced in that they now took legal charge of
their wives' property as well. A man did not have to obtain his wife's
permission or participation in legal transactions, and in many respects, their
relationship resembled that of a guardian and incompetent. Professor John
E. Cribbet aptly described this historical perception as "[t]he common law
' 8
regarded the husband and wife as one and the husband as the one."

B. THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACTS

By the mid 1800's, women's discontent with the status of wives,
particularly with respect to property law, was apparent. Expressions of this
discontent ranged from refusals to marry to the formation of various forms
of prenuptial agreements in an attempt to create by contract what the
common law prevented. Similarly, creative trust arrangements were
established in an attempt to protect women's property or to provide for
women separately from their husbands. Significant differences in legal
status and ways around the barriers existed between states and regions,
resulting in a "diverse, often paradoxical scheme of statutes and case
law .. .. 29

Beginning with the Mississippi Woman's Law of 1839, one state after

another enacted either statutes or constitutional provisions that granted

married women a separate legal existence and the right to own and manage

property. Termed the Married Women's Property Acts, these laws
abrogated many of the common law rights and authorities given to husbands

with respect to their wives' property and established that a married woman
retained her separate legal identity. Similar acts, although "piecemeal and
27. Under common law traditions, a married couple was considered to be one entity,
becoming in effect one person after marriage. See supra notes 21-22 and the accompanying
text. Although some legal remnants of this doctrine remain, see, e.g., infra, section III
regarding person status for payment limitations purposes, it is no longer an accepted view

of the marriage relationship. As the United States Supreme Court stated, "Nowhere in the
common-law world--indeed in any modem socieiy--is a woman regarded as chattel or
demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition
as a whole human being." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980).
28. JOHN E. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 86 (1975).
29. David H. Bromfield, 1987 Survey of Books Relating to the Law, 111. Legal History,
Review of Women and the Law of Propertyin Early America, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1109 (1987).
30. The continued recognition of the estate of tenancy by the entireties in some
jurisdictions represents one way in which the Married Women's Property Acts failed to
completely remove the husband's legal dominance over his wife's property. Under early
common law, a tenancy by the entireties, arising when property was conveyed to a husband
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uncoordinated' were passed in all American jurisdictions.32
While there are individual state differences, the Married Women's
Property Acts create four general areas of legal rights for married women.
First, they establish that a married woman shall have the same legal
existence and legal personality as a single woman. This provision
establishes the wife's independent legal existence; she is entitled to her own
rights and responsibilities under the law. She is no longer legally "one"
with (or subject to) her husband.3 3
Second, the Married Women's Property Acts establish the separate
property rights of the wife, i.e., the right to retain and to obtain and control
property separate from her husband. Property in this regard includes not
only real property, but personal property, and intangible property such as
choices in action. The right of ownership and control applies to both premarital property and also to separate property acquired during marriage. 34
Third, the acts generally provide that the wife is free to enter into and
to be bound by legal contracts. She is thus responsible for her own
contractual obligations, including her debts. She is similarly responsible for
35
her torts.
and wife with unity of time, title, interest and possession, the husband held numerous rights
including possession, management and alienation. As the Married Women's Property Acts
did not mention this estate specifically, jurisdictions differed widely on their interpretation
of the continued validity of the estate. Greene, supra note 22, at 81 (citations omitted).
31. Greene, supra note 22, at 79-80.
32. 41 C.J.S. Husband And Wife § 14 (1991).
33. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 519.01 (1994). This statute provides that:
[w]omen shall retain the same legal existence and legal personality after marriage
as before, and every married woman shall receive the same protection of her rights
as a woman which her husband does as a man, including the right to appeal to the
courts in her own name alone for protection or redress.
Id.
34. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 519.02 (1994). This statute provides that:
[a]ll property, real, personal, and mixed, and all choses in action, owned by any
woman at the time of her marriage, shall continue to be her separate property,
notwithstanding such marriage; and any married woman, during coverture, may
receive, acquire, and enjoy property of every description, and the rents, issues and
profits thereof, and all avails of her contracts and industry, free from the control
of her husband, and from any liability on account of his debts, as fully as if she
were unmarried.
Id.
35. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 519.03 (1994). This statute provides that:
[e]very married woman is bound by her contracts and responsible for her torts, and
her property shall be liable for her debts and torts to the same extent as if
unmarried. She may make any contract which she could make if unmarried and
shall be bound thereby, except that every conveyance and contract for the sale of
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Fourth, the acts provide that a spouse is not liable for the debts of the
other spouse except for debts incurred for necessary household articles and
supplies to be used by the family. Where under common law, a wife had
been held to be liable for her husband's debts, this provision establishes
independent liability for spouses. A married woman is no longer automatically liable for her husband's debts, and her separate property cannot be
taken by her husband's creditors.3 6
In summary, the Married Women's Property Acts, passed in all
American jurisdictions in one form or another, revolutionized traditional
concepts of the husband/wife relationship. Legally, a married couple is not
a single entity; husbands and wives each have a right to make their own
37
Each
decisions with regard to finances, associations, and legal affairs.
to
prior
spouse
that
by
owned
spouse retains separate ownership of property
manage,
to
marriage, and the owner spouse has the legal authority
encumber, transfer, and to exercise all other incidents of legal title without
the consent or participation of the non-owner spouse. Moreover, each

Id.

real estate or any interest therein, shall be subject to and governed by the
provisions of section 507.02.

36. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 519.05 (1994). This statute provides that:
[a] spouse is not liable for any debts of the other spouse, except for necessaries
furnished to the other after marriage, where the spouse would be liable at common
law. Where husband and wife are living together, they shall be jointly and severally liable for all necessary household articles and supplies furnished to and used
by the family.
Id. As an example of the application of this type of statute, see Freeman v. Heiman, 426
F.2d 1050 (10th Cir. 1970). Applying the Oklahoma version of one of the Married Women's
Property Acts, the court held that the wife's property, including her individually owned
horses, could not be subjected to a creditor's lien pursuant to a judgment against her husband.
Summarizing Oklahoma law on this subject, the court stated:
Mrs. Heiman was not a party to the action nor the supplemental proceedings in aid
of execution. The only testimony in the record is that the horses and the stock
belonged to Mrs. Heiman. Under Oklahoma law the separate property of a wife
cannot be subjected to the claims of the husband's creditors. (citation omitted) In
Oklahoma a wife has the same freedom of contract with regard to her separate
property as the husband. There is no presumption that the property acquired by the
wife during the marriage was paid for by funds furnished by the husband and
subject to his debts. (citations omitted) Under these circumstances the court
lacked the requisite jurisdiction to enter any order affecting Mrs. Heiman's
property.
Id. at 1053 (citations omitted). A different result would have been reached had the creditor
at issue proved that the property did not belong individually to Mrs. Heiman or if the debt
at issue had been a joint obligation.
37. See, e.g. Denoncourt v. Commonwealth, 470 A.2d 945, 947 (Pa. 1983); Estate of
Grossman, 406 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. 1979).
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spouse is entitled to have a separate ownership interest in his or her own
property, even property that is acquired during the marriage.3"
C. AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT PROPERTY ALLOCATION SYSTEMS

Although the fundamental principles embodied in the Married Women's
Property Acts remain at least theoretically valid in all American jurisdictions, states are split with regard to the more specific rules governing the
division of property between a husband and wife. That is, while the law is
clear that a wife is a separate legal entity with rights under the law equal to
that of her husband, in determining the rights of either spouse to property
acquired during the marriage, state law has developed in two different
directions. On one hand, the majority of states adhere to what is termed the
common law system of property allocation. Under this system, no rights to
property arise specifically by virtue of the marriage.3 9 On the other hand,
a minority of states have adopted community property law as their system
of property allocation. In a community property state, although the
separateness of pre-marital property is generally retained, there is a
presumption that property that is acquired during the marriage is held as
community property regardless of title.4°
1.

Common Law (Title) Jurisdictions

The majority of states follow a system of property law allocation under
which neither spouse is found to possess an ownership interest in property
solely because of the marriage. This system is termed the "common law"
system in that it has not been statutorily modified by the community
property laws discussed infra. It is acknowledged, however, that these
jurisdictions adopt the common law principles as modified by statutes such
as the Married Women's Property Acts that give fundamental property rights
to women.
According to this system of property allocation, title to property is
38. As will be discussed, the right to acquire property during the marriage and retain
separate title to the exclusion of one's spouse may be somewhat restricted in community
property states. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
39. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); see also In re Lapp, 66 B.R. 67, 69
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); In re Wolsky, 53 B.R. 751, 754 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); In re
Oetinger, 49 B.R. 41, 43 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985) (specifically in the context of family farm
property). For a discussion of the common law approach to property allocation between
spouses, see LAWRENCE J. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 4-5 (1983).
40. 41 C.J.S. Husband & Wife, § 122 (1991); see, e.g., United States v. McConkey,
430 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1970). For a general discussion of the community property system
of property allocation see GOLDEN, supra note 39, at 5-7.
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determinative of its ownership. Beyond record title, or with regard to
untitled property, the courts generally consider the time that the property
was acquired4' and/or the source of funds used in acquiring the property.42 In general terms, whichever spouse contributed directly to the
acquisition of the property is held to own that property.
The potentially harsh results obtained by a rigid application of this
system have produced various statutory and judicial modifications. Most
involve an attempt to recognize the indirect contributions of a spouse to the
acquisition of marital property. These modifications are particularly
prevalent with regard to property allocations in the context of dissolution of
marriage. The most commonly accepted modification is termed "equitable
distribution," a concept based upon the view of marriage as a partnership or
joint enterprise.' 3 It acknowledges that both spouses are likely to have
contributed to the economic well being of the marriage and recognizes that
indirect benefits such as homemaking services should be rewarded.
Equitable distribution, however, only applies to property divisions in the
context of dissolution actions. It does not effect title to property during the
term of the marriage, but rather has been recognized as an inchoate right
that does not mature until dissolution."
2.

Community Property Jurisdictions

The separateness of the husband and wife's respective interests is
45
challenged in jurisdictions that have adopted community property law.
Community property law is based on the concept that during the marriage,
"the spouses are partners working together to enhance the marital enterprise." 46 The marriage is seen as an economic unit, and the spouses are
presumed to be equal contributors to that unit, regardless of their respective
47
roles or direct monetary contributions.
Thus, in general terms and with certain exceptions, in a community
41. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 383 P.2d 840, 842 (Idaho 1982); Cain v. Cain, 536
S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
42. See, e.g., Harper v. Harper, 448 A.2d 916, 929 (Md. 1982); Tibbetts v. Tibbetts,
406 A.2d 70, 77 (Me. 1979); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817, 824-25 (Mo. 1984).
43. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Komnick, 417 N.E.2d 1305 (Ill. 1981).
44. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). In the family farm context, see In re
Brollier, 165 B.R. 286, 291 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1994). For this reason, the decisions issued
in dissolution cases are generally only instructive in so far as they discuss the ownership of
property prior to the divorce.
45. For a discussion of community property system, see Greene, supra note 22, at 7276.
46. GOLDEN, supra note 39, at 6.
47. See Greene, supra note 22, at 82.
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property jurisdiction, property that is acquired during the marriage, through
the efforts of either the husband or wife or both, along with the products
and proceeds of that property, are presumed to belong to both spouses.
There are specific, but somewhat limited statutory exceptions to this
presumption, e.g. in most states gifts, bequests and inheritances made to a
4
specific spouse retain a separate character.
Unlike equitable distribution of assets in a common law state, under
community property laws, each spouse has a present equal interest in the
marital assets. 9
An essential distinction between the community and common-law systems is the nature or quality of ownership of
the non-acquiring spouse in the accumulations that occur
during the marriage. Under the community system, the
non-acquiring spouse has a vested, present ownership
interest in one-half of the community property. If the
same property were similarly acquired in a common-law
state, the non-acquiring spouse would have no vested
present interest in the property. 0
As will be discussed, however, the appropriate question in many family farm
situations is whether the farm wife is an "acquiring" spouse by virtue of her
contribution to the farming enterprise.

48. 41 CJ.S. Husband & Wife § 136 (1991).
49. Greene, supra note 22, at 87.
50. Id.
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II. THE COMPLEX REALITY OF CURRENT HUSBAND AND WIFE ROLES ON
THE FARM: PROPERTY INTERESTS IN THE FAMILY FARM
51
It is one thing to propose, and another to execute.

Although the law is clearly established that spouses have the right to
own separate property and each spouse is unquestionably a separate legal
entity, in reality, the lines are frequently blurred. For example, in the
context of a family farm, profits from the farming operation as well as
separate earnings of husbands and wives are often commingled in joint bank
accounts, property is often acquired during the marriage with these
commingled funds, and assets may be encumbered to finance the farming
operation. In this situation, the spouses, and the farming operation itself,
may go on for years without regard to the ownership rights or the legal
relationship of each of the spouses. However, when a legal crisis such as
financial distress, divorce, or the death of one spouse occurs, the courts may
be asked to unravel the complex relationship and determine who owns what
and where liability lies.
Whether the farm wife has an ownership interest in the assets of the
farming operation may be very important in a number of respects.
Assuming an ongoing farming operation, it may determine whether she has
control over that asset, whether her interest in it has been encumbered by
her husband's actions, and whether she is entitled to certain exemption and
51. The Mice in Council, in AESOP FABLES (Thomas James trans., 1848). The fable
supporting this moral is as follows:
Once upon a time, the mice, being sadly distressed by the persecution of the cat,
resolved to call a meeting, to decide upon the best means of getting rid of this
continual annoyance. Many plans were discussed and rejected; at last a young
mouse got up and proposed that a bell should be hung around the cat's neck, that
they might for the future always have notice of her coming, and so be able to
escape. This proposition was hailed with the greatest applause, and was agreed to
at once unanimously. Upon which the old mouse, who had sat silent all the while,
got up and said that he considered the contrivance most ingenious, and that it
would, no doubt, be quite successful; but he had only one short question to put,
namely, which of them it was who would bell the cat?
Id. While it is not to be inferred that the granting of legal ownership rights to married
women is dangerous, i.e., akin to the belling of a cat by a mouse, the difficulty that the
courts have encountered in making a determination that a farm wife owns one half of the
family farm exemplifies the proverb. Moreover, as will be discussed, some courts do seem
remarkably adverse to such a finding, although one would not expect them to question the
underlying right of married women to own property. Placing the bell on the cat in a specific
case may be more painful than agreeing to the abstract concept.
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lien avoidance rights in bankruptcy. In the event of a death, it may
determine whether the assets are part of the decedent's estate. In the event
of divorce, it may determine the appropriate division of assets. As will be
discussed in the final section of this presentation, it may also be critical to
her characterization as a separate person for purposes of farm program
payment limitations. In this context, the discussion will focus on the
following issues: (1) Does the wife have an ownership interest in the family
farm assets?; and (2) If the wife does have an interest in the farm assets,
what authority or control can she exercise over it?
A. DOES THE FARM WIFE HAVE AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE ASSETS OF
THE FARMING OPERATION?

There are several ways in which a farm wife can be found to own farm
property. The property can be hers as separate pre-marital property. If it
is acquired after marriage, it can be hers as a separate asset, a half interest
can be hers as a joint owner with her husband, or she can have an interest
as a partner in farm partnership property.52 With regard to family farm
corporations, the wife, as shareholder, can also have a clearly defined
ownership interest. 3 The court may find, however, in situations were the
husband is a farmer, that the family farm assets are his separate property and
that the wife has no ownership interest at all.
1.

Pre-maritalProperty

It is clear that a single woman is entitled to own her own property prior
to marriage. As has been discussed, it is now also clear that a wife is
entitled to retain this separate ownership after marriage. Under the current
law in all of the states, a wife is a separate legal person, and she is entitled
to retain ownership and control of her individual pre-marital property
separate from her husband. This is true in both common law and community property jurisdictions.54 The most conclusive evidence of ownership is

52. Infra notes 72-124 and accompanying text. Some courts imply that co-ownership
is not an option and focus their decision solely on partnership law. Infra notes 109-17.
53. Because ownership of stock in a family farm corporation is established clearly by
shares held, this topic is usually only contested in dissolution actions. It will not be
addressed further herein.
54. Income earned from separate property is considered marital property in some
jurisdictions. Similarly, improvements made to separate property or commingling of separate
property with marital assets may create a joint interest. Greene, supra note 22, at 72-73
nn.5-6 and accompanying text.
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legal title, and for untitled property, ownership is generally determined
according to possession, control, and the intentions of the parties."
2.

Assets Acquired During the Marriage

The ownership of assets acquired during the marriage is determined in
part by whether either the matrimonial domicile 6 or the property itself is
located in a community property jurisdiction.57 In either of these special
situations, community property rules may apply.
a. Community Property
Consistent with the concept of the marriage as an economic unit with
each fpouse acting equally for the good of that unit, community property
law generally presumes that the assets of the family farm, acquired during
the marriage, are owned equally by the spouses.
An example of the application of community property rules to a farm
wife's rights in farm property is provided in United States v. McConkey.58
In this case, the United States government brought an action for foreclosure
against real property in Idaho, a community property jurisdiction.
Previously the debtor-husband had borrowed funds from Farmers Home
Administration for home improvements and had executed a mortgage on the
property as security for the loan. The debtor indicated on the loan and
mortgage documents that he was single, when in fact, he was married, although he and his wife had not lived together for over ten years. Although
the court noted that its decision was "rather harsh," it affirmed the district
court in holding that the mortgage was invalid. 59 Because the property was
acquired while the couple was married, it was community property
belonging to both spouses, and an encumbrance against community property
is void unless both husband and wife join in the execution and their
signatures are acknowledged. 6' Because the wife did not sign the mortgage, the court held that the mortgage interest was invalid.6'

55. See supra notes 41-42 and the accompanying text.
56. As a general rule, the law of the matrimonial domicile controls the property rights
of the husband and wife. See, e.g., Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101, 110 (1930).
57. A state statute may extend the community property system to nonresidents who
purchase real estate within the community property state. 41 C.J.S. Husband & Wife § 125
(1991). See, e.g., Black v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1940).
58. 430 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1970).
59. Id. at 653.
60. Id. (citing IDAHO CODE § 32-912).
61. Id.

1994:689]

WHO OWNS THE FAMILY FARM?

It is important to note, however, that even in community property
jurisdictions such as Idaho, there are exceptions to the strict rules.62 The
community property statutes in Idaho provide that one spouse can "give to
the other the complete power to sell, convey, or encumber" community
property by "express power of attorney. '63 Similarly, with regard to debts
found to be community debts, this obligation can be enforced against
community property."
Because the majority of the states have not adopted the community
property system, however, and because community property rules are
statutorily defined in each adopting state, these rules will not be discussed
further.
b; Common Law (Title) Jurisdictions
In non-community property (common law or title) jurisdictions, the
analysis used to determine the ownership of property varies depending upon
whether record title can be established.
i) Titled Property
In a non-community property state, property acquired during a marriage
In these jurisdictions, the
can be either separately or jointly owned.'
ownership of titled property will generally be determined according to
record title, particularly if the rights of a third party such as a mortgagee are

62. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also addressed the community property rules
as applied to agricultural interests in the case of Reimann v. United States, 315 F.2d 746 (9th
Cir. 1963). This case concerned a Soil Bank Conservation Reserve Contract signed only by
the husband. The contract evidenced enrollment in a government conservation program
whereby farmers removed certain acreage from cultivation. The husband in this case sought
release from his contractual obligations on the grounds that his wife had not signed the
contract. He argued that the contract constituted an encumbrance on their community
property farm. The court, however, rejected his arguments, holding that the contract was not
an encumbrance, but rather, was a personal agreement relating to the management and
control of the farm. Under state law, the husband was authorized to manage the property,
and his wife need not join in the contract in order for it to be valid. L. at 749.
63. Id. The use of principles of agency to authorize the husband to act on behalf of
his wife is discussed infra notes 128-50 and accompanying text.
64. 41 C.J.S. Husband & Wife § 166 (1991).
65. See, e.g., Ballard v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 788, 791 (D. Mont. 1986)
(Montana has not adopted community property laws, therefore property can be owned and
controlled separately by each spouse; marital status alone does not establish an ownership
interest in property).
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at issue. Record title is termed the "highest evidence of ownership. '' 66 A
non-record claim or equitable title can sometimes be established, but the
person asserting equitable title has the burden of proof.67

For example, in a recent Seventh Circuit case," the United States

attempted to foreclose a tax lien against the taxpayer's home and the
attached property. The wife objected, claiming an ownership interest in the
property, although her name had never appeared on the record of title and
the property had been a gift to her husband from his mother. The court
rejected her claim in large part because record title indicated that at the time
the tax lien attached, the husband owned the property as sole owner.69 The
court also noted that Indiana law provides that a husband can convey
property owned in his own name without the consent or signature of his
wife.

70

In summary, in common law jurisdictions, the ownership of titled
property will generally be determined according to record title, particularly
if the rights of a third party such as a mortgagee are at issue.71
ii) Untitled Property
A determination of ownership is more complicated with regard to
untitled property, particularly for property that is in the possession of both
the husband and wife. This determination may be particularly difficult in
unincorporated family farm situations where significant untitled business

66. United States v. Denlinger, 982 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1992).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-3.1 (West 1979)). The taxpayer had
conveyed the property to a church, a conveyance held to be invalid because of fraud.
71. There are, of course exceptions to this rule. In the Wisconsin case of Wall v.
Department of Rev., 458 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990), the court held that "[o]wnership
means substantially more in the way of enjoyment or the possession of other indicia of
ownership than bare or paper title. Beneficial ownership, therefore, not mere technical title
is determinative." Id. at 817 (citations omitted). At issue was investment property that a
married couple had purchased jointly. Through the seller's mistake, however, title to the
property had been placed in the wife's name alone. Both husband and wife's names
appeared on the mortgage note, and but for the actual deed, all pertinent documents related
to the sale listed both names. The Wisconsin Department of Revenue objected to the
husband's claim of a loss for tax purposes on the property, arguing that he was not the owner
of the property. The court rejected this argument and held that the property was in joint
ownership. Id. See also In re Brollier, 165 B.R. 286, 291 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1994) (wife
found to have ownership interest for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 363(i) (1988) despite title in
husband's name alone).
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assets are present on farm homestead property. In analyzing this situation,
there are several possible outcomes. Clearly, either husbands or wives are
entitled to own property separately, or they can own it together as joint
owners. 72 Alternatively, with regard to business transactions and assets, it
is sometimes found that the husband and wife are partners. If so, the
property at issue may belong to the partnership, with each partner having an
interest therein.
Arguably, a finding in favor of joint ownership or partnership is most
consistent with the concept of a "family farm." A number of courts have
reached this result. Other courts, however, have held that the farm wife has
no ownership interest in the family farm assets and that these assets belong
exclusively to the farm husband. Although under some circumstances, this
finding may be justified, in many cases, this result fails to accurately reflect
the economic and social interdependency of the family farm operation.
Moreover, as will be demonstrated, the courts are not united in their
analysis, leaving many questions unanswered and much uncertainty as to
what a wife must do to establish her ownership interest.
Joint Ownership
A number of cases have addressed the issue of husband and wife joint
ownership of family farm assets. 3 Several courts have held that under the
specific facts presented, the husband and wife operating the family farm
were co-owners of their untitled farm assets. The case of Matter of
Slagle,74 provides an example of this holding. This case involved a
husband and wife that operated a family farm. Experiencing financial
72. See, e.g., In re Griffin, 141 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992). The distinctions
between the several forms of co-ownership, i.e., joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety and
tenancy in common are beyond the scope of this discussion.
73. Many of the cases discussing the role of the wife in the family farm setting arise
in dissolution actions. As principles of equitable distribution frequently cause the court in
these actions to make property awards inconsistent with legal ownership, these cases often
do not address the fundamental question of joint ownership. For example, the bankruptcy
court in In re Wolsky, 53 B.R. 751 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) rejected the farm wife's reliance
on dissolution precedent for determining her interest in the farm property. The court stated
that the cited case dealt "with the equitable distribution of property in a divorce proceeding
and not the issue of legal ownership of property ....
Id. at 754 n. 1. The court found the
precedent "neither persuasive nor controlling." Id. at 755. Other types of cases that address
the issue of farm wife ownership of family farm property include secured transaction
disputes, bankruptcy litigation and estate taxation. Given the assets and the number of family
operated farms involved, there are surprisingly few decisions, however, that have addressed
this fundamental question.
74. In re Slagle, 78 B.R. 570 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987).
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difficulties with the operation, they filed for relief under Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The first issue addressed by the court in this case was
certain untitled
whether the wife, Mrs. Slagle, owned a one-half interest in 75
personal property i.e., crops, livestock, and farm machinery.
In deciding whether Mrs. Slagle had an interest in the personal
property, the court considered her involvement in the farming operation, the
parties' intentions, and evidence of joint tenancy with regard to other farm
assets. Although Mrs. Slagle held an off-farm job, the court found that she
took an active part in the farming operations in the evenings, on weekends,
and during the summer. Both Mr. and Mrs. Slagle testified that it was their
intention that all property acquired after their marriage be held in joint
tenancy. Indeed, the property that was titled or registered was listed in joint
tenancy. Mr. Slagle, however, handled all of the financing arrangements for
the operation with the bank, and he alone signed the loan documents. Under
these facts, the court held that Mrs. Slagle had a one-half interest in the
personal property at issue.76
The same result was reached in the case of Farmers Security State
Bank of Zumbrota v. Voegele.77 As in Slagle, one of the issues addressed
in this case was the family farm wife's ownership interest in farm personal
property. This property had been sold to satisfy the husband's debts, and
the wife sought her share of the proceeds. In this context, the court upheld
the trial court finding that the husband and wife were co-owners as tenants
in common of the farm personal property. This finding was supported by
the wife's testimony that she considered the farm to be a "family enterprise"
as well as evidence that both spouses contributed labor to the farming
operation.78
Similar conclusions have been drawn in a number of farm bankruptcy
cases in which the farm wife sought to claim a "tools of the trade"
exemption in items of farm equipment. In general terms, this claim involves
showing that the equipment claimed as exempt is property that is necessary
to farming and that the wife is engaged in farming. Implicit in the
exemption claim is also that the wife has an ownership interest in the

75. Id. at 571-72.
76. Id. at 572.
77. 386 N.W.2d 760 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
78. Id. at 762. The bank argued against Mrs. Voegele's claim of a one half interest
in the property and alternatively alleged that Mrs. Voegele was estopped from challenging
their right to the property. This alternative allegation was based on the argument that Mr.
Voegele acted as his wife's agent in encumbering the assets. The court also rejected this
allegation. Id.
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claimed property. The majority of courts have allowed the wife to claim the
exemption.79
The bankruptcy court in In re Griffin'° held that the farm property at
issue was co-owned by the husband and wife and described the burdens of
proof and persuasion presented. The court first noted that the existence of
co-ownership should be determined from "evidence of the intent and
conduct of the party claiming title.""1 The court then stated that the "usual
procedures for determining title to property" should be followed. 2 The
burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion is
upon the person asserting title. If a prima facie case is presented, the
objecting party then must meet its burden of rebutting that case. 3 Once
some degree of co-ownership is established, a rebuttable presumption of a
tenancy in common, i.e., equal ownership arises. The objecting party has
the burden of overcoming this presumption."
Other cases have rejected the family farm wife's claim of joint ownership of farm assets, however, including cases involving similar facts. For
example, in the case of Farmers and Merchants National Bank v. Schulz,85

a bankruptcy court addressed the issue of a farm wife's ownership of
untitled personal property associated with the operation of the family farm
and concluded that the wife had no ownership interest.8 6 Under the facts
of this case, the husband and wife had been married for thirty years and
owned all of the titled farm real estate and personal property as joint

79. See, e.g., In re Kobs, 163 B.R. 368, 372-74 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994) (wife is found
to be co-owner of farm equipment and found to perform numerous farming tasks sufficient
to classify her occupation as farming; wife's claim of "tools of the trade" exemption in
farming equipment valid); In re Meckfessel, 67 B.R. 277, 278 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986) (wife
who "helps farm their mutual property for their mutual debt" is allowed to claim "tools of

the trade" exemption in farm equipment based on testimony regarding her participation in
farming activities); In re Schroeder, 62 B.R. 604, 606 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986) (wife's
testimony established that she was a farming partner with her husband; "tools of the trade"
exemption allowed for partnership farm equipment); In re Oetinger, 49 B.R. 41, 43 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1985) (same); but see In re Indvik, 118 B.R. 993 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990) (brothers'
farming operation found to be a partnership; individual partners not allowed to claim partnership property as exempt under Iowa law).
80. 141 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992).

81. Id. at 210.
82. Id.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 211.
85. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Schulz (In re Schulz), 63 B.R. 168 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1986).
86. Id. at 171-72.
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tenants.8 7 The court acknowledged that Mrs. Schulz had participated in the
farming operation with her husband throughout their marriage. As in the
Slagle case, Mr. Schulz, handled all of the financing arrangements with88the
bank and executed all of the loan and security agreements by himself.
Rejecting Mrs. Schulz's claim, the court found that the property at issue
belonged solely to Mr. Schulz.8 9 As support for its decision, the court
stated that under Nebraska law, there must be an express agreement between
the husband and wife in order for the wife to acquire an ownership interest
in the husband's property in return for her services.' In the absence of
this express agreement, the wife involved in the farming operation is not
entitled to a one-half interest in the farm property. 9' The court also stated
that an ownership interest in farm property "must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence, the quality of which is clear, satisfactory and
convincing in nature." 92 For these reasons, the court held that Mrs. Schulz
did not have an ownership interest in any of the untitled farm property. 93
In another Nebraska case, a determination of whether all of the farm
assets were included in the decedent-husband's estate, the same result was
reached, and the same rationale applied.'" In this case, the surviving wife
claimed an ownership interest in one-half of the farm personalty and argued
that her interest should be excepted from her deceased husband's augmented
estate. The court described the wife's farming activities as follows:
She participated in such chores as raising chickens, selling
eggs and fryers, milking cows, and separating and selling
cream. She also purchased some milk cows, fed cattle
and hogs, scooped grain, put up hay, and chopped sunflowers, cockleburs, and musk thistles by hand. Additionally, she fixed fence, drove tractors, and stacked hay
bales, as well as helping to repair and weld machinery,
repairing and reshingling farm buildings, and assisting in
the. butchering process, including the cutting up of all the
meat by herself.95

87. Id. at 170.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 171-72.

90. Id. at 171 (citing In re Estate of Carman, 327 N.W.2d 611 (Neb. 1982)).
91. Id. (citing Peterson v. Massey, 53 N.W.2d 912 (Neb. 1952)).
92. Id. (citing In re Whiteside's Estate, 67 N.W.2d 141 (Neb. 1954).
93. Id. at 171-72.
94. In re Estate of Carman, 327 N.W.2d 611 (Neb. 1982).

95. Id. at 614.
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The court characterized the wife's argument as "that she did more than
merely perform as a farmwife; that in fact she functioned as a partner in the
farming operation, or in any event did at least as much as would a hired
hand; and, thus, one-half of the items of farm production and other items
of personalty were to be treated as being owned by her outright."96 The
court rejected the wife's claim, characterizing the issue as whether the wife's
labor "constitutes a contribution in money's worth' such that one-half the
value of the farm production and jointly acquired personalty should be
excluded from the augmented estate and set over to appellee as her own
property. 9 7 Espousing "the traditional view," the court held that "in the
absence of an express contract to compensate a spouse for extra and unusual
services, no obligation to do so will be implied."9'
In many ways, these two holdings beg the question of husband/wife
ownership. The courts base the decisions on the theory that a wife's claim
is for a share of her husband's property and that her entitlement is based on
her right to compensation for the services she performs. This characterization of the wives' claims, however, is both inaccurate and inappropriate.
The courts appear to begin from the premise that the family farm assets are
owned and managed by the husband and contrasts this ownership with
activities by the wife with respect to "his" property. This analysis skirts the
joint ownership issue by presuming the husband's initial ownership. The
possibility of joint ownership is not squarely discussed by either court. As
such, the courts fail to address the fundamental issue of whether family farm
assets that are acquired as the result of the labors of both spouses are joint
properties."

96. Id.
97. Id. The court, however, acknowledged a number of tax court cases that have
supported the wife's position. Id. (citing Craig v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 378 (N.D.S.D.
1978); In re Estate of Kersten, 239 N.W.2d 86 (Wis. 1976); Estate of Everett Otte, 41
T.C.M. 72,076 (1972)).
98. Carman, 327 N.W.2d at 614 (citing Peterson v. Massey, 53 N.W.2d 912 (Neb.
1952); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 272 N.W. 919 (Neb. 1937)).
99. The court in In re Brollier, 165 B.R. 286 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1994) raised the
distinction between a wife alleging an interest in her husband's property, e.g., in a dissolution
action, and a wife claiming an independent interest as co-owner of property. Id. at 291. The
court discussed the Kansas state law regarding dissolution actions, then noted, "[t]hat issue
is different from the issue et hand. Linda Brollier [the wife] does not claim an interest in
her husband's separate property. She claims her interest arises as a co-owner." Id. In
determining whether the claim of co-ownership was valid, the court looked beyond the legal
title to evidence of the "intent and conduct of co-ownership." Id. The wife testified that the
property was purchased with marital funds, encumbered by a mortgage in the name of both
husband and wife, both spouses paid rents and profits together, and both reserved a remainder
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While one can speculate on the differences between the cases, this

analysis is perhaps most instructive in showing that courts have difficulty

with the ownership issues in the family farm context. For example, the
contrasting cases of Slagle and Schulz, cases from the same jurisdiction, the
same court, indeed, the same judge, illustrate the difficulty that the courts
have with the issue of the ownership rights of farm wives. 1°° Moreover,
the wives' participation in the farming operation described in these cases
were very similar, and yet in Slagle and Voegele, the wife was adjudged to
be a half owner, while in Schulz and Carman, the wife was found to have
no interest at all. Farm wives, who have participated in the farming
operation, whether in a supportive or managerial role may find it upsetting
to learn that according to some courts, the farm belongs solely to the
husband. On the other hand, some husbands, and clearly some lenders may
be equally as upset to find that the wife has a one-half interest. The
uncertainty of the farm wife's legal status with respect to the farm assets is
unsettling. In this regard, it may be helpful to consider the following

interest in the property upon conveyance. Based on this evidence, the court held that the
wife was a co-owner entitled to exercise her right of first refusal to purchase the bankruptcy
estate's property. Id. at 292.
100. It is difficult to reconcile the different results in Schulz and Slagle. Farmers &
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Schulz (In re Schulz), 63 B.R. 168 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986); In re
Slagle, 78 B.R. 570 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). It is clear that the judge did not intend to
overrule or to cloud his earlier decision against the wife, as Schulz is cited in the subsequent
Slagle opinion. There is no explanation provided, however, for the different legal results.
It appears likely that the court in Schulz objected to the manner in which the issues were
raised, as the judge characterized the case as "another example of creative lawyering." In re
Schulz, 63 B.R. at 174. In Schulz, the husband had filed bankruptcy and was represented by
legal counsel. The wife, however, had not filed bankruptcy, but claimed an ownership
interest in farm property in which a creditor also claimed a security interest. Without the
permission of the court, the husband permitted the wife to take possession of secured farm
property, to sell or dispose of those assets and to dispose of the proceeds therefrom. The
court strongly objected and warned that it may "in the future, find that any advice provided
by counsel to debtor-in-possession which led debtor-in-possession to acquiesce in the claim
of a non-party as to ownership of the property, is advice that shall not be compensated." Id.
at 174. The court also stated that counsel was absolutely prohibited from representing a
debtor-in-possession and a non-debtor who claimed an ownership interest in the property,"
adding that "(a]ny such activity in the future by counsel in this case or any other case may
result in sanctions." Id. Although this fact situation no doubt influenced the court's ruling,
the court's finding that Mrs. Schulz did not have an ownership interest in the property was
not necessary to reach the end result in favor of the creditors. As the court itself
acknowledged, even if it had found that Mrs. Schulz had a property interest, there are several
legal theories under which the encumbrance of her interest would still be valid. Id. at 17273.
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checklist of factors that could, or perhaps should, influence a court's
determination of ownership in a family farm setting.
"

First, the court can consider general indications of the parties
intentions regarding the farm operation and the assets associated
therewith. These indications were mentioned by the court in
Slagle. There, the husband and wife testified that it was their
intention that the farm be a joint business. Consistent with this
intention, titled property was in joint tenancy. Similar evidence,
such as joint decision-making on farm operation issues would also
support a finding of joint ownership of farm assets.

"

Second, the specific decision-making involved in purchasing the
assets at issue can be considered. For example, did the wife
participate in the decision to purchase the tractor or to invest in a
hog facility?

*

Third, how were the assets in question obtained? Did the parties
have a joint checking account that was used for farm purchases?
For example, if the wife deposits her earnings from her off-farm
job into a joint account that was used in the farming operation, it
can be argued that her separate assets were used to purchase farm
property, giving her an interest in that property. Similarly, if her
income is used for necessary family expenses, thereby allowing all
of the farm income to be channeled directly back into the farm
operation, consideration should also be given. These arguments,
however, should not be used to the disadvantage of farm wives
that work hard, for no specific pay, at tasks on the farm.

"

Fourth, with regard to crops grown on jointly titled real estate,
absent a rental agreement between the spouses, it can be argued
that both the husband and wife have a specific interest in the
1
crops.

*

Fifth, the courts generally consider what types of farm labor the
wife may perform. The court in Slagle specifically referenced this
evidence. Courts may, however, place too much emphasis on

101. For a general discussion of ownership interests in crops see Susan A. Schneider,
The Ownership of Growing Crops: The Continuing Struggle Between Property Law and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 8 J. AGRiC. TAx'N & LAW 99 (1986).
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actual physical labor. Given the complexities of modem farming,
arguably, the management, decision-making, and investment are
more true indices of involvement in and ownership of the
operation than who actually plows or plants.1°2
Partnership
Alternatively, some courts have addressed the ownership of family farm
assets by undertaking an analysis of partnership law. In some cases, a farm
wife has been found to be an owner of farm property as a partner in a
farming partnership with her husband.
Under the Uniform Partnership Code as enacted in most states, "[a]
partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit." 3 With regard to property, "[a]ll property
originally brought into the partnership stock or subsequently acquired by
purchase or otherwise, on account of the partnership is partnership
property. '"l14 "A partner is co-owner with the other partners of specific
partnership property-holding as a tenant in partnership."' 05
The application of partnership law to the issue of ownership of farm
property by the farm wife has been addressed in a number of cases. For
example, in In re Oetinger,'" a bankruptcy case in which the court was
asked to determine the ownership interests of farm equipment, the court
applied partnership law. In this case, Mrs. Oetinger testified that she
operated the farm equipment, plowing, disking, and cultivating. She helped
with haying, hauled grain, and purchased fertilizer. She fed and helped load
the hogs. Although she also had off-farm employment, she worked off the
farm only twenty hours per week, leaving, as the court observed, "many
hours before and after work and on weekends for her labor on the

102. For example, one of the requirements to establish "person" status for purposes of
receiving farm program payments, the farmer must make a significant contribution of "active
personal labor," "active personal management" or a combination of the two. Thus, payment
limitations rules recognize that a farmer can satisfy his or her "significant contribution" to
the farming operation by contributing through management decision-making. Kelley &
Malasky, supra note 2, at 232. It is not necessary that the farmer "actually" operate farm
equipment; see infra note 107.
103. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 323.02(8) (1994).
104. See, e.g., MINN.STAT. § 323.07 (1994).
105. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 323.24 (1994).
106. 49 B.R. 41 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985).
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farm."" The court found that this evidence constituted a prima facie
showing that Mrs. Oetinger's principal occupation was farming.O8
The court then considered the ownership issue. Curiously, the court did
not consider joint ownership, but rather stated,
Mrs. Oetinger claims to be co-owner of all of the farm
equipment. She does not set out the theory under which
she deems herself entitled to ownership status, but the
Court is of the opinion that the only way she can be
co-owner of the equipment is by virtue of a partnership
between her and heq husband."°
Defending this turn to partnership law, the court noted that "a spouse does
not acquire a joint interest in all the property belonging to the other simply
by virtue of the marriage." 10 The court cited Kansas law as specifically
providing that "a married person may carry on a trade or business on his or
her separate account and the earnings therefrom shall be his or her sole and
separate property' to be disposed of and invested in his or her own
name.""' The court further noted that if "Mr. Oetinger were the only
farmer in the family, Mrs. Oetinger would not automatically acquire an
ownership interest in the farm earnings or property purchased with the
earnings simply by virtue of being married, because Kansas is not a
112
community property jurisdiction."

107. Id. at 43. The opinion states that Mrs. Oetinger testified that she "actually"
operates farm equipment. Traditional roles aside, arguably, one either does or does not
operate equipment, and the significance of the term "actually" can only be taken to imply
some special note of recognition or astonishment the part of the court. This raises two
issues: one, the courts tend to overemphasize the importance of running farm equipment in
establishing one's status as a farmer. See supra note 102. Second, the frequently erroneous
stereotype of women as mechanically ignorant or incompetent continues despite the
increasing technical sophistication of women farmers.
108. Oetinger, 49 B.R. at 43.
109. Id. Subsequent courts applying Kansas law have held that partnership theory is
not the only way for the court to find that the farm wife has an interest in family farm assets.
In In re Griffin, 141 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992), the court explicitly held that the farm
husband and wife did not operate the farm as a partnership. In so doing, it rejected a
lender's argument that Oetinger applied. The court did not overrule Oetinger, nor did it
criticize its reasoning. Rather, the Griffin court held that the husband and wife owned the
farm assets as co-owners. See also In re Brollier, 165 B.R. 286, 291 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1994) (co-ownership of assets by husband and wife is allowed).
110. Oetinger, 49 B.R. at 43.
111. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-204(1988)).
112. Id.
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The court then turned to partnership law, stating that "[a] partner, on

the other hand, occupies a very different position. All property acquired by
a partnership is partnership property, in which each partner has an
interest.""' 3 The court relied on the definition of a partnership as "an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit" and held that the Oetingers' farming operation met this definition. ' 14 The court thus held that Mr. and Mrs. Oetinger were partners, that
the farm machinery was partnership property, and that accordingly, Mrs.
Oetinger held an interest in the machinery as a partner."'
A number of other cases have also addressed the role of husbands and
wives under partnership law. Several cases follow the reasoning set forth
in Oetinger,indicating that, at least under specific facts, in order to find that
the wife has an ownership interest in the farm assets, a partnership must be
found. 116 Absent joint title, these cases appear to state that joint ownership absent a farm partnership is not possible. Of these cases, the courts are
7
split as to whether a partnership is created." At least two courts have
analyzed a family farm operation and ruled that an informal husband and

wife partnership was created without discussing joint ownership as an

alternative."8 Unfortunately, there does not appear to be a clear pattern
guiding the court's analysis and the standards which evidence a partnership
remain ambiguous." 9

113. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-308(a), -325(a)(1988)).
114. Oetinger, 49 B.R. at 43 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-306(a) (1988)).
115. Id. The court did not actually state that the farm machinery was partnership
property, but this finding can be assumed from the holding.
116. In re Lapp, 66 B.R. 67, 69 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (in order to prove joint
ownership without joint title, farming partnership must be shown); In re Schroeder, 62 B.R.
604, 606 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986) (stating that "the only viable theory which would give [the
wife] a co-ownership status in the farm earnings or property purchased with farm earnings
is that she is a farming partner"); In re Wolsky, 53 B.R. 751, 755 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985)
(absent substantial individual "outside" contribution to the purchase of the farm assets, any
legal interest that the wife asserts must be grounded in partnership law).
117. See Schroeder, 62 B.R. at 606 (holding that a husband and wife partnership exists);
Lapp,66 B.R. at 70) (same); but see Wolsky, 53 B.R. at 755 (wife is not a partner in farming
operation).
118. Craig v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978) (finding husband and wife
farm partnership supporting the removal of one-half of the farm assets from the decedent
husband's estate); Georgens v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 406 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (affirming trial court finding of farm partnership in secured transaction dispute).
119. There was not a partnership agreement or other writing evidencing a partnership
in any of the cases discussed herein. Obviously, such an agreement or writing would be
strong evidence of the existence of the partnership.
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Other courts have discussed partnership law, but held that joint ownership is an alternative way for a family farm wife to establish an ownership
interest. For example, the court in In re Griffin declined to find a partnership under facts similar to those in Oetinger."° The court stated that "the
mere fact that the wife participates in the conduct of a business with her
husband" does not "necessarily establish a partnership between them, unless
there exist some other indicia of partnership and the intent to form a
partnership is clearly proven." 2 1 One of the factors that the court found
would indicate a partnership was "proof of a right to a division of profits,
instead of a deposit of all profits into a joint account with the joint use of
income."' 22 The court held that despite the fact that the Griffins worked
as a "team," because there was no evidence of a specific method of profit
sharing, no specific evidence of an intent to create a partnership, and no
evidence that they held themselves out to be partners, no partnership would
be found.' 3 As an alternative route to establishing the wife's ownership
interest, however, the court found her to be a joint owner of the farm

assets. 124

Thus, the application of partnership law to the family farm setting has
produced divergent results. Not only do the courts disagree as to the line
between partnership and non-partnership farming, there is not a clear
articulation of why they disagree. Moreover, the courts are split on the very
existence of an alternative to partnership law for finding an ownership
interest in the family farm wife. Admittedly, the finding of an informal
partnership under the Uniform Partnership Code is a murky task, nevertheless more clear guidance from the courts would be of great assistance to
farm lenders as well as farm couples.
In summary, there are several ways that a farm wife can establish her
ownership rights in farm property. A record of its existence as her own
separate pre-marital property or a title record evidencing some type of
ownership are the two most certain ways to establish this interest in a noncommunity property or common law jurisdiction. It may also be possible,
however, to establish her interest as a joint owner or a partner. As the cases

120. Griffin, 141 B.R. at 207.
121. Id. (citing 59 AM. JUR. 2D Partnership §§ 240-42).

122. Id.

123. In re Griffin, 141 B.R. 207, 212 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992). The court also held that

it is the party asserting the partnership status that carries the burden of proof. In this case,

it was the bank that alleged that the husband and wife were partners. The bank sought to
use this status to overcome the failure to obtain the wife's signature on the security
documents. Id.

124. Id. at 210.
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indicate, there is no clear standard for establishing this interest under either
theory.
B. IF THE WIFE DOES HAVE AN INTEREST IN FARM ASSETS, WHAT AUTHORITY
OR CONTROL CAN SHE EXERCISE OVER IT?

The ownership of property generally carries with it the basic rights of
possession and control. The next issue to be addressed with regard to the
rights of farm wives is, assuming that they do own farm property, what
rights and responsibilities do they have with regard to that property?
Under the general law established by the Married Women's Property
Acts and associated legislation, a married woman is free to exercise all
incidents of ownership over her property. That is, she is free to contract
with regard to, to sell or otherwise convey, to encumber, or to use in any
Similarly, a married woman's
way, her own separate property."z
the reach of her husband's creditors with regard
separate property is beyond
126
to his separate debts.
With regard to jointly held or husband and wife partnership property,
however, the issues become more difficult. Each spouse has an interest in
this property. Must decisions with regard to this property be made together,
or is one spouse authorized to control the interest of the other? Husbands
and wives obviously have the right to determine between themselves who
will be responsible for certain types of decisions and certain activities.
However, when dealing with decisions that affect the rights of third parties,
legal controversy as to the respective rights and authority of the spouses
may arise.
This potential controversy is best illustrated by reference to farm
finance and credit issues. As farming is recognized as a capital intensive
business, real estate and operating loans are essential to most farms. As
such, along with the ownership of farm property comes the decision whether
to encumber that property as security for loans. A prudent, or at least welladvised farm lender will inquire as to the interests of the husband and wife,
and -unless ownership is clearly only in one spouse, will require the
signature of both on all loan documents.
With regard to titled property, it appears that most lenders follow this
"well-advised" course of action. It is clear from the case law, however, that
all lenders are not so well-advised with regard to untitled farm personal
125. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 519.02 (1994); see also Freeman v. Heiman, 426 F.2d
1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 1940); Kirk v. Kirk, 16 A.2d 47, 49 (Pa. 1940); In re Peterson's
Estate, 93 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1939); Proulix v. Parrow, 56 A.2d 623, 628-29 (Vt. 1948).
126. See, e.g., Davis v. Mathews, 361 F.2d 899, 902 (4th Cir. 1966); Freeman v.
Heiman, 426 F.2d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 1940).
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property, and in fact, many appear to make the assumption referenced in the
Schultz case that "the male operator of the farm [is] the actual owner of all
the assets."' 27 Their first consideration that the wife may have an interest
comes as a challenge to their rights as secured lender to proceed against the
collateral. The facts typically are that the wife claims an interest in the farm
property, and the bank did not obtain her signature on the loan documents
or the security agreement. The issue becomes whether the security interest
attached or is perfected with respect to her interest in the property.
There are a number of published decisions addressing this fact pattern.
The legal theories generally advanced by creditors in these cases are the
related rules of either agency or partnership law. Examples of the
application of these theories to this fact pattern are set forth below.
1.

Principlesof Agency in the Family Farm Setting
In some instances, a spouse is found to have acted as the agent of the
other, and if a principal-agent relationship is found, the law of agency will
prevail. Marriage alone does not create the presumption of an agency
relationship between the spouses, 28 and unless statute provides otherwise,
the burden of establishing agency is on the asserting party.' 29 Nevertheless, agency law has been applied to give legal effect to the husband's
actions with regard to property that is separately owned by the wife. 3 '
It is thus no surprise that with regard to jointly owned property, the courts
have frequently found a principal-agent relationship between farm spouses.
For example, in the previously discussed Slagle case, 13 ' at issue was not
only whether Mrs. Slagle owned a one-half interest in the untitled farm
property, but if so, did the creditor's security interest extend to her
ownership interest. Although Mrs. Slagle was actively involved in the
farming operation, only Mr. Slagle signed the notes, security agreements and
financing statements. Mrs. Slagle testified that sometimes she did not know
of her husband's borrowing until after the fact.

127. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Schulz (In re Schulz), 63 B.R. 168, 170
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1986).
128. Brayley v. Arkhola Sand & Gravel Co., 159 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Ark. 1942); Gordon
v. O'Brien, 71 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Mass. 1947); Krauss v. Litman, 56 A.2d 37, 39 (Md. 1947).
129. Schram v. Burt, 111 F.2d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 1940); Schneidau v. Manley, 39 A.2d
885, 887 (Conn. 1944); H.O. Brackeny & Son v. Ryneiwicz, 78 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Mich.
1956).
130. Sheeks v. Daugherty, 28 S.W.2d 1064, 1066 (Ark. 1930); Jackson v. Faver, 77

S.E.2d 728, 738 (Ga. 1953).

131. In re Slagle, 78 B.R. 570, 572 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987).
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After finding that Mrs. Slagle was a joint owner of the farm property
at issue, the court held that Mrs. Slagle had authorized Mr. Slagle to act as
32 The court found
her agent in encumbering their jointly held property.
that Mrs. Slagle was aware of all decisions with regard to the farm and was
aware that her husband was borrowing money to finance the operations,
even though she may have opposed some of the borrowing. The court held
that her "acquiescence to her husband's actions amounted to 33a ratification
In further
of them" and held that her husband had acted as her agent.'
quoted
court
explaining the agency relationship as applied to spouses, the
the Nebraska Supreme Court:
Agency will not be presumed from the marital relation;
but the fact that the wife has such knowledge [of husband's activity on her property], in the light of other
evidence, may be of strong corroborative value. Owing
to the close relationship existing between husband and
wife, an agency by the husband may be created by slight
It is unnecessary that they enter into
circumstances."
any formal contract of agency, nor is it necessary that the
wife expressly state to her husband that she gives him
authority to act. Such an agency may be inferred from
the things said and acts done.' 35
The Slagle court concluded by stating that it was "compelled to
emphasize that the question of whether a wife has authorized her husband
36
to encumber her property is strictly an issue of fact."'1 The court stated
that in situations where the wife was unaware of the loans37 and was
be reached.'
uninvolved in the operation, a different result may
As suggested by the Slagle court, if it can be shown that the husband
138
An
acted without the wife's authority, she will generally not be bound.

132. Id.

133. Id.

134. This is an example of the special consideration of the marriage relationship that
is frequently given by the courts. Although as noted, husbands and wives are separate legal
entities, the court's recognition of the "close relationship" of marriage often influences the
court's analysis.
135. Slagle, 78 B.R. at 572 (citing Buffalo County v. Richards, 326 N.W.2d 179, 182
(Neb. 1982).
136. Id. at 573.
137. Id. Had Mrs. Slagle been unaware or uninvolved, however, she may not have been
able to establish her half interest in the property, thus rendering the agency issue moot.
138. Schneidau v. Manley, 39 A.2d 885, 887 (Conn. 1944); Buchanan v. Adams, 327
S.E.2d 775, 776 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
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agent generally does not bind the principal if his or her actions are
unauthorized. For example, in the Voegele case, the creditor argued that if
Mrs. Voegele had an interest in the farm property, she was nevertheless
estopped from challenging its security interest because her husband was
acting as her agent when he signed the security agreement.'3 9 The court
rejected this argument and held that Mr. Voegele signed the security
documents individually and not as an agent for his wife."
Authorization, however, need not be express. One court found simply
that the wife's acquiescence to her husband's control of the farming
operation authorized him to sigri security documents on her behalf without
express authorization. 4' Another court noted that for years the wife had
"accept[ed] the fact that her husband was borrowing money
and pledging as
security for those loans all of the assets of the farm."' 142
Moreover, in some circumstances, the lack of authority defense, even
if established, may not prevail. Several courts have found that under
specific facts, the spouse is estopped from protesting against the actions of
the other spouse, even though authorization may not have been specifically
given. 43 If it appears that the wife is allowing her husband to act as her
agent with regard to her property and a third person relies upon a good faith
belief that agency exists, at least two courts have held that the wife is
estopped to deny that her husband acted as her agent.'" She is thus,
bound by his actions. 4 5 Addressing the issue of estoppel and good faith
reliance in this context, however, the Voegele court held that "[a] party
cannot evoke estoppel when it could have discovered the true facts upon
exercising reasonable prudence."'"
The court found that the bank had
"notice of her [Mrs. Voegele's] ownership of the property but
failed to take
cognizance of it.' ' 147 As such, Mrs. Voegele was not estopped from
claiming that her interest in the property had not been encumbered. 148
139. Farmers Sec. Bank of Zumbrota v. Voegele, 386 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Minn. Ct.
App.
1986).
140. Id.
141. In re Kinney, 16 B.R. 664, 665 (D. Mo. 1981).
142. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Schultz (In re Schultz), 63 B.R. 168,
172
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1986).
143. Schulz, 63 B.R. at 172; Kinney, 16 B.R. at 665.
144. Sahio Corp. v. Grudder, 32 N.E.2d 148, 151 (I11.
1941); Wilson v. Todd, 26
N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 1940).
145. Grudder,32 N.E.2d at 151; Wilson, 26 N.E.2d at 1005.
146. Farmers Sec. Bank of Zumbrota v. Voegele, 386 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Minn. Ct.
App.
1986).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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Adding a different twist, the Griffin court held that even though agency
49 The court
existed between the spouses, the bank was still not protected.
found that Mr. Griffin's signature as agent for his wife was sufficient for
attachment of the security interest. The court also found, however, that the
financing statement, which was signed by Mr. Griffin alone, was seriously
misleading with regard to Mrs. Griffin's interest. This defect rendered the
security interest unperfected with regard to her interest in the farm
assets.1 -5
2.

A Partner'sAuthority to Bind the Partnership

In a number of cases, the courts have found that the partnership
relationship of the spouses authorized one spouse to act on behalf of the
partnership and the other spouse. Under the Uniform Partnership Code:
every partner is an agent of the partnership for purposes
of its business and the act of every partner, including the
execution in the partnership name of any instrument, for
apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of
the partnership binds the partnership, unless the partner so
acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in
the particular matter, and the person with whom the
of the fact that the
partner is dealing has knowledge
151
authority.
such
partner has no
The decision in the Oetingercase provides an example of the authority
152
As discussed
that can be exerted by a partner over partnership property.
supra, in Oetinger, the court found that Mr. and Mrs. Oetinger operated
their farm business as a partnership and that all farm assets were partnership
assets. As a second issue, the Oetingers alleged that the bank had an unperfected security interest in the farm equipment because it had failed to obtain
Mrs. Oetinger's signature on the financing statement. The court held that
Mr. Oetinger's signature on the financing statement bound the partnership.
The court stated that:
Each partner is an agent of the partnership and may bind
the partnership contractually with a third party. The
exception to this is when a partner does not have actual
149. In re Griffin, 141 B.R. 207, 213-14 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992).

150. Id.

151. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 323.08 (1994).
152. In re Oetinger, 49 B.R. 41, 43 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985); see supra notes 106-15 and
accompanying text.
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authority and the third party dealing with the partner has
actual notice of the partner's lack of authority. The
mortgages entered into by Mr. Oetinger in this case are
binding on the partnership and on Mrs. Oetinger as
partner. Mr. Oetinger had apparent authority to bind the
partnership and the lender had no notice of any lack of
authority. The financial statements were signed by Mr.
Oetinger and his signature is sufficient to bind the partnership and encumber Mrs. Oetinger's interest in the proper153
ty.

As further support for its holding, the court also found that Mrs.
Oetinger, in effect, ratified her husband's actions. The court stated that
"[riatification is the adoption or confirmation by a principal of an act
performed on his or her behalf by an agent without authority."'" It may
"consist of receiving and retaining the benefits of the act."'155
Upon
acquiring knowledge of an agent's unauthorized act, a principal has a duty
to promptly repudiate the act. Without this repudiation, ratification of the
act is presumed. 56 Because Mrs. Oetinger was aware of her husband's
actions and accepted the benefits of the loan, she could not later claim that
he acted without her authority. The court therefore found that the creditor
had a perfected security interest in Mrs. Oetinger's share of the farm
equipment.
Following the reasoning of Oetinger, the bankruptcy court in In re
Lapp,157 held that because the husband and wife acted as a farm partnership, the husband's signature on the creditor's security agreement encumbered both of their interests in the farm property. 58 The court noted that
a partner ratifies the actions of the other partner by accepting the benefits
of the actions and not repudiating them. Mrs. Lapp, who never repudiated
the security interest her husband gave and who accepted the loan benefits,
was precluded from later objection. In effect, the court places a duty on
farm wives to be more involved and more assertive about their involvement
or to risk being found to have acquiesced in their husband's decision
59
making.

153. Id. at 43-44 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-309(a)).
154. Id. at 44 (citing Theis v. duPont, Glore Forgan, Inc., 510 P.2d 1212 (Kan. 1973)).
155. Id. (citing Will v. Hughes, 238 P.2d 478 (Kan. 1952)).
156. Id. (citing Stratmann v. Stratmann, 628 P.2d 1080 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981)).
157. 66 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
158. Id. at 70.
159. The Lapp case provides an example of the different duties placed on the parties
by the various courts. In Voegele, the court was influenced by the bank's knowledge that
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Reaching the same result, the court in Georgens v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp." held that a husband and wife farm partnership existed
and that accordingly, the husband had "apparent authority" to bind the
partnership.' 6 ' Because Mrs. Georgens did not deny or withdraw this
authority, but rather accepted the benefits of the loans, she was estopped
from denying the existence of a secured interest in her share of. the farm
property.' 62
In summary, even though a farm wife may establish that she holds an
ownership interest in the farm assets, she may not be found to have retained
the authority to make decisions regarding this property. Particularly with
regard to the rights of third parties, the courts may find that the wife
expressly or implicitly authorized her husband to encumber her interest in
the property. Once a farming partnership is found, this result is even more
likely. If the wife does not wish to grant this authority to her husband, she
should be explicit and direct in asserting this intention.

Mrs. Voegele had an interest in the farm. This knowledge prevented the bank from
successfully claiming that Mrs. Voegele should be estopped from denying the attachment of
the security interest to her property. In Lapp, the creditor also had knowledge of the wife's
involvement and obtained her signature on a guaranty wherein she made a separate promise
to pay the debt. Nevertheless, the court placed the burden on Mrs. Lapp to show repudiation.
The different approach may stem from the finding of joint ownership in Voegele and
partnership in Lapp. But see infra text accompanying note 162.
160. 406 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
161. Id. at 98.
162. Id. The court distinguished Voegele noting that the bank had no duty of inquiry,
Georgens had never been involved in any of the financing transactions. The court
Mrs.
as
stated that this lack of involvement supported the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Georgens
had the authority to transact business for the farm.
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III. THE SPECIAL LAW OF FEDERAL FARM PROGRAMS: THE HUSBAND
AND WIFE RULE '

Women do not lose their constitutionallyprotected liberty when
they marry. The Constitution protects all individuals, male or
female, married or unmarried,from the abuse of government
power, even where that power is employed for the supposed
benefit of a member of the individual'sfamily.16 3
Despite both statutory' 4 and constitutional' 6 recognition of the
preservation of the legal rights of women after marriage, at least one vestige
of the unity of husbands and wives remains. This holdover from the archaic
common law tradition can be found in the payment limitations provisions
of the federal farm programs. While an analysis of the complexities of farm
program law with regard to payment limitations is far beyond the scope of
this article, the following summary provides a brief analysis of how payment
limitations rules have affected farm wives."

The amount of farm program payments that can be received is limited
by payment limitation rules authorized by statute and implemented by
regulations. 67 In general terms, these rules serve three functions. They
set a cap on the dollar amount that a producer can receive. They restrict
163. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2831 (addressing the rights of
women to decide whether to have an abortion).
164. Supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text regarding the Married Women's
Property Acts.
165. Supra note 163 and accompanying text.
166. Although farm program payments are not subject to the same ownership analysis
discussed supra with regard to tangible farm assets, their contribution to most family farm
operations cannot be underestimated. It is well documented that federal farm program
payments provide a substantial source of income to many farm operations. For example, in
1989, a total of approximately $9.3 billion in federal farm program payments were made to
about 1.5 million payees. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RCED-92-2,
AGRICULTURAL PAYMENTS: EFFECTIVENESs OF EFFORTS TO REDUCE FARM PAYMENTS
HAS

BEEN LIMITED, 22 (1991). For an excellent and detailed discussion of payment limitations
law, see Kelley & Malasky, supra note 2. Hailed as "an excellent resource for making sense
of the rules governing the amount of federal farm program payments any one person or
business can collect," this article has the rare distinction of being a law review publication
discussed both in Time magazine (David Ellis, A Bumper Crop of Loopholes, TIME, Apr. 8,
1991, at 21) and on the CBS television show "60 Minutes" (Dec. 8, 1991). Andy Jacobitz,
Farming the Government, FAM FUTURES, July-Aug. 1991 at 18. While this publicity is
clearly a tribute to the work of the authors, it is also a strong indication of the controversy
surrounding the payment limitations topic.
167. Kelley & Malasky, supra note 2, at 203.
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eligibility for payments to persons who are actively engaged in farming, and
they limit a producer's 168ability to create different entities that qualify
separately for payments.
The payment limitations rules set forth specific provisions applicable
to corporations, to partnerships and joint operators, and to husbands and
wives. The treatment of husbands and wives for payment limitations
purposes has been a controversial topic, one that resulted in specific, but
unsuccessful legal challenges, and two legislative amendments. Although
much has been gained politically for farm wives in this area, there remains
a persistent effort to retain the antiquated perceptions of wives one with
their husbands.
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE HUSBAND AND WIFE RULE

The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1970 and the subsequent farm bill
legislation limited the amount of payments that a person could receive under
9 The legislation also required the
each of the various farm programs.
Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations defining the term "person" for
7°
The regulations promulgated by the
payment limitation purposes.
a husband and wife would be
purposes,
Secretary provided that for these
7
considered one person, eligible for one payment. ' This rule applied
irrespective of the nature of each spouse's interests and was irrebuttable"'
A judicial challenge to the restrictive husband and wife rule was
brought in United States District Court for the District of Columbia.'
The plaintiffs, a non-profit women's agricultural trade association, Women
Involved in Farm Economics (WIFE), did not challenge the application of
the "separate person" requirements to spouses, but rather challenged the
irrebuttable presumption that husbands and wives could not meet these
"separate person" requirements. They alleged that the irrefutable treatment

168. Id. at 209.
169. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-524, § 101, 84 Stat. 1358-59.
Subsequent farm program legislation continued the payment limitations concept. See Kelley
& Malasky, supra note 2, at 203-04 n.3.
170. See Kelley & Malasky, supra note 2, at 203-04 n.3.
171. 35 Fed. Reg. 19,339, 19,340 (1970) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 795.11).
172. Although special criteria were set forth in order to allow partnerships and
corporations to qualify as separate persons, the regulations expressly provided that regardless
of the circumstances '[a] husband and wife shall be considered as one person." 7 C.F.R. §
795.11 (1987).
173. Women Involved in Farm Economics v. United States Dept. of Agric., 682 F.
Supp. 599 (D.D.C. 1988) [hereinafter WIFE I]. An unsuccessful challenge to the
constitutionality of the husband and wife rule was also brought in Martin v. Bergland, 639
F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1981).
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of a husband and wife as one person, while allowing other entities such as
partnerships to meet the requirements for multiple person status, violated the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution as an infringement on the fundamental
right to marry and as an impermissible discrimination on the basis of
gender. They also alleged that the rule violated the Administrative
Procedure Act both because it was arbitrary and capricious and because it
was promulgated in excess of the agency's statutory authority. 74
While the case was pending, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act'
of 1987 was passed.' 75 This legislation addressed the husband and wife
rule and provided that:
[s]uch regulations shall provide that, with respect to any
married couple, the husband and wife shall be considered
to be one person, except that any married couple consisting of spouses who, prior to their marriage, were separately engaged in unrelated farming operations, each spouse
shall be treated as a separate person with respect to the
farming operation by such spouse so long as such operation brought into the marriage remains as a separate
farming operation, for the purposes of the application of
the limitations under this section.' 76
The Secretary of Agriculture was instructed to promulgate final regulations
implementing the amendments by August 1, 1988, effective for the 1989
crop year.'" Under the regulations effective beginning with the 1989 crop
year, the general rule was that spouses would be combined as one "person"
with one exception. This only exception applied in cases where the spouses
had been engaged in separate and unrelated farming operations prior to
marriage and those operations continued separately after marriage. 7 1
The district court in WIFE I, rejecting arguments that the case was
moot because of the statutory amendment, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
holding that the husband and wife rule violated both the Fifth Amendment
and the Administrative Procedure Act. The court rejected the government's
argument that the "economic interdependency of married couples" made it
174. WIFE I, 682 F. Supp. at 600; see also Women Involved in Farm Economics v.
United States Dept. of Agric., 876 F.2d 994, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1989) [hereinafter WIFE II].
175. Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1987 (containing the Farm Program
Payments Integrity Act of 1987), Pub. L. 100-203, §§ 1301-07, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-12 to

1330-19.

176. Id. § 1303(a)(2)(B)(iii), 133 CoNo. REC. H12,108 (1987).

177. Id. §§ 1301(a), 1305(a)(1)(A) and (B).
178. 7 C.F.R. § 1497.19 (1990).
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"too futile and expensive" to evaluate their operations individually for
79 The court stated that
compliance with the payment limitation rules.'
[w]hile marital status might be a relevant test of economic
dependency for other statutory purposes, see, e.g., Jobst,
434 U.S. at 54, 98 S. Ct. at 99 (allocation of disability
benefits), it is plainly irrelevant under the crop subsidy
program. Indeed, the Secretary has seen fit to not make
such stereotypical assumptions with regard to other
economically dependent entities, e.g., partnerships, and
instead created substantive criteria for them to meet in
order to be eligible for payments. Rationally, the same
80
analysis should apply to married couples.
The court was also persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that the "plain
and ordinary meaning of the term 'person' requires rejection of the archaic

"
notion that husbands and wives are one 'person'. '1 Although the court

rejected the argument that the regulation interfered with the right to marry,
the court held that the payment limitation rule based on marital status was
"not rationally related to achievement of the legitimate government purpose"
and as such, was unconstitutional.'82 The court also held that the regulation violated the Administrative Procedure Act in that it was "not consistent
with the agency's statutory mandate to interpret the term 'person' fairly and
reasonably in accordance with the congressional mandate to encourage
18 3
Accordingly, the
participation in the farm crop subsidy program."
court enjoined enforcement of the rule.'
The USDA appealed the case, and the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed.' 85 The appellate court rejected the argument
that the regulation was not authorized by the statutes and held that the
regulation was a reasonable interpretation of the underlying statutory provisions."' 6 The court based this holding on its findings that Congress was
"concerned about the public outcry against what were perceived as excessive
crop subsidy payments,"'8 7 the express directive in the statute for the
179. WIFE I, 682 F. Supp. at 604.

180. Id.at 605.
181. Id.

182. Id. at 606.
183. Id. at 607.
184. Id. at 608.
185. WIFE II, 876 F.2d at 997-1003.
186. Id.
187. The court disagreed with the district court's concern with maximum participation
in the farm programs, stating that "[t]his analysis impermissibly ignores the purpose of the
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Secretary to define "person" status, and "closeness of the family relationship."'8 8 With regard to the latter rationale, the court accepted the
agency's argument that it would be "particularly difficult" to analyze the
husband and wife's "separate economic contributions" to their farming
operations. 89 This argument is based on the agency's admission that "it
is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to draw an exception for the
unusual husband and wife that maintain economic independence without
0
enabling every farm couple to qualify."'9
For these reasons, the court
held that the regulation was authorized by and consistent with the statutory
191
authority given to the Secretary.
After finding that the regulation was consistent with and authorized by
the statutes, the court addressed the constitutionality of both the regulation
and the underlying statute.' 92 Consistent with the district court's analysis,
the appellate court held that there was not direct and substantial interference
with the right to marry, a finding that would indicate heightened scrutiny.193 Applying the rational basis analysis, however, the appellate court
payment limitation which itself operates to restrict the amount of acreage diverted from
production; we cannot examine the husband-wife rule exclusively through the lens of
.maximum participation' without according some significance to
Congress' willingness to
impose a,
payment limitation on the program." Id. at 1002.
188. Id. at 1000-01. Although the court cites "family closeness" in support of the
agency's decision that it would be too difficult to evaluate the separate contributions of a
husband and wife, it must be noted that the regulations did provide a limited exception for
minor children to qualify as separate persons. Moreover, family farm partnerships between
parents and adult children or between siblings are regulated only under the partnership
requirements; no special rule based on "family closeness" is established.
189. Id. at 1001.
190. Id. Arguably, this statement reflects the real reason for the agency's (and
Congress') firm adherence to husband and wife payment restrictions: budgetary concerns.
In a time in which the cost of farm programs is a hotly contested issue, any means to limit
payments presents advantages. It can also be argued that the farm wife lobby, despite the
existence of formidable organizations such as WIFE, is not nearly as powerful as the
commodity groups which may advocate the availability of various business structures as
a
"way around" payment limitations. See JIM CHEN, AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC
LAW (forthcoming) (manuscript at 951-56, on file with author). In any case, more directed to the premise
of this article, is the agency's acceptance of the farm wife's participation and involvement
in the family farming operation. The court in WIFE II restates the Secretary's assertion that
"the typical farm spouse could easily establish a separate contribution of labor." WIFE II,
876 F.2d at 1002.
191. Id. at 997-1000.
192. Id. at 1004.
193. Id. Neither court applied the intermediate scrutiny test applicable to sex
discrimination cases because on its face, the restriction is applied equally to husbands and
wives. Thus, arguably it is not discriminatory toward women, although the practical effect
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reversed the district court, holding that the restriction on husbands and wives
was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.'" The court
denied that "sexual stereotyping" was at issue, stating that there was no
evidence that the regulation implied "anything at all about the respective
9 Rather, the court concluded
roles of men and women in a marriage."'
that the challenged regulation did no more than to assume that "married men
and woinen constitute one economic unit."'" The court noted that special
treatment of husbands and wives is permissible in other contexts, e.g.
income taxation, food stamp availability, estate taxation, and accordingly,
the court found it to be permissible with regard to farm program payments.197 The plaintiffs petitioned for review by the Supreme Court, but
review was denied 98
B. THE CURRENT HUSBAND AND WIFE RULE

The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990'99 again
changed the husband and wife rule, furthering the exceptions to the general
requirement that they be treated as one person. According to this statute, "at
the option of the Secretary," a husband and wife could be treated as separate
persons for payment limitations if they each meet all of the requirements for
separate person status imposed on other individuals, and if they do not hold,
directly or indirectly a substantial beneficial interest in more than one entity
earning a payment.
Subsequent to the 1990 legislation, the Secretary exercised his "option"
and amended the regulations.20' It is now possible for a husband and wife
to obtain separate payments provided that they meet the separate person test,
and provided that they do not have a substantial beneficial interest in more
than one entity earning a payment, including the spouses themselves. But
is such.

194. Id.

195. Id. at 1005.
196. Id. For a discussion of "marital interdependence," as seen by the courts, see Debra

Kahn, ConstitutionalLaw - Perpetuatingthe Presumption of Marital Interdependence Under
the Agricultural Act - Women Involved in Farm Economics v. United States Dept. of Agric.,

63 TEMP. L. REv. 881 (1990).
197. WIFE II,876 F.2d at 1005-06.

198. Women Involved in Farm Economics v. Yeutter, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).

199. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, §

1111, 104 Stat. 3359, 3497-500 (amending § 1001 of the Food Security Act of 1985, Pub.
L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 3341-46 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1308 to 1308-3)).

200. Id.
201. 56 Fed. Reg. 8287, 8290 (1991) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1497) (proposed Feb.

28, 1991).
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for the one entity rule, they are treated just as a farm partnership would be
treated for purposes of payment limitations. 2°2 Much of what WIFE was
unable to win in court was obtained through amendments to the statute and
regulations. Although the one entity rule precludes husbands and wives
from obtaining the same level of maximization of payments that would be
available to separate individuals, wives have come a long way toward status
as real farmers under the farm programs.
CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that women in pre-industrialized agriculture were
a vital component of the traditional family farm. Historians and anthropologists recognize that in the Midwestern farm family in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, both male and female tasks were "central to the
maintenance of the economic health of the family farm. ' 20 3 Even the
folklore of this time period acknowledged the central role that female work
played in farming, and farmers (male) were advised "of the need to marry
a 'good strong woman.' 204
There can also be little doubt that society has changed dramatically
since that time period. While these changes have had a dramatic impact on
farming, the integral role of the farm wife in the majority of family farm
operations remains intact. While her role may have changed, her importance
to the farming operation has not.2 5
Despite this importance, many husbands and wives involved in family
farming operations continue to disregard their respective interests, either
assuming or never questioning the ownership status of the farm assets.

202. 7 C.F.R. § 1497 (1993).

203. LINDA K. KERBER & JANE SHERRON DEHART, WOMEN'S AMERICA - REFOCUSING

THE PAST, 119-20 (1991).
204. Id. This analysis includes reference to a folksong from this era describing the
extent and the difficulty of female farm labor. It recounts an old man's wager that "he could
do more work in one day than his wife could in three." To challenge this assumption,
husband and wife exchanged tasks, and the song describes the various difficulties
encountered by the soon overwhelmed husband. The song ends with the declaration that "by
all the stars in heaven .... his wife could do more work in one day than he could do in
seven." Id. at 120 (citing JEAN RITCHIE, THE SWAPPING SONG BOOK, 54-55 (1952)).
205. Farm publications frequently focus on the husband and wife team. These articles
often note that the farm wife is "critical to the family farm operation." See, e.g., Dave
Mowitz, He's Marriedto His Hired Hand, SUCCESSFUL FARMING, Mid-March 1994 at 54.
As this title and the ensuing article indicate, however, farm publications have much the same
problem as do the courts. The subtitle to the article states "Actually Laurie is an essential
partner in the Ingram farm and she's as handy running a field cultivator as going for parts."
Id.
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When asked to sort out this status, the courts have failed to develop
consistent guidelines by which to evaluate the role of the typical family farm
wife. Husbands and wives who operate their farming operation together are
well advised to give careful consideration to their legal status and its
potential interpretation by the courts in their jurisdiction.

